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ABSTRACT
The American South went through a period of political transition in the late 20th
and early 21st centuries. This transition reached its climax after the 1994 elections, after
which Democrats ceased to hold the majority of House seats in the South, never to regain
that strength. However, Democrats continued to win a decent share of House seats in the
South after 1994, with about 40% of Southern House seats being won by Democrats until
the 2010 elections, after which Democrats shrunk to a much smaller minority.
This paper analyzes the factors that allowed some Democrats to continue to be
elected to the House from Southern districts between 1994 and 2010. I find that two of
the same constituency factors that correlate to Democratic victories elsewhere in the
country, namely a larger non-white population and a more urban population, correlate to
Democratic strength in Southern House districts between 1994 and 2010. On the other
hand, I find that races featuring incumbents (as opposed to open seat races) and the
number of Democratic officials elected to other offices from the same state do not
significantly correlate to Democratic strength in those House elections.
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INTRODUCTION
The South, for the bulk of American history, was dominated by the Democratic
party. Arising from the its opposition to Reconstruction, Democrats had total or near-total
control of local, state, and federal offices from the 1870s until the 1960s. The Republican
Party began to make political inroads into the region with Barry Goldwater’s presidential
run in 1964. Despite losing in a nationwide landslide, Goldwater won five states in the
Deep South—the first time any Republican presidential candidate had done so since the
end of Reconstruction. As the Democratic Party moved leftward, especially on civil
rights and social issues, conservative southerners began to defect from the party.
However, the huge institutional advantage the Democrats had amassed over nearly 100
years of complete dominance in the region allowed the party to maintain a majority of
Southern offices up through 1980. Perman (2010) describes the process as a dealignment:
that is, increasing numbers of Southerners began to no longer see themselves as
Democrats, but had yet to positively identify as Republicans (335). After 1980, as
Republicans ramped up operations in previously uncontested regions, a significant
number of Republicans began to win office in the South. This realignment culminated
with the Republicans’ victory in the 1994 congressional elections, delivering Newt
Gingrich (a Southern Republican) the speakership and marking the first time that
Republicans held a majority of Southern House seats (335-6).
After the Democrats’ defeat in 1994, many institutional advantages that
compelled Southern conservative politicians to stay in the Democratic Party disappeared
(see Campbell 1996, 8–9). Having lost their majority, Democratic Party membership no
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longer conferred advantages such as committee chairmanship. And yet, despite the 1994
elections marking the beginning of Republican dominance in the south, many districts in
the South continued to return Democrats to Congress for the next 20 years, until a series
of heavy midterm losses during the Obama administration all but eliminated the
Democrats in the South outside of urban cores and majority-black districts.
Fig.1

Figure 1 shows the share of Southern House districts that Democrats won across
each general election between 1992 and 2018. In 1992, Democrats won over 60% of
districts in the South. After the next election, Democrats held a minority of Southern
seats. In 2014, Southern Democrats reached their nadir at under 30% of Southern seats,
and in the two subsequent elections, Democrats have made modest gains. In the figure,
two precipitous drops in Democratic success are evident: the elections of 1994 and 2010.
Budge and Farlie, in their 1983 book Explaining and Predicting Elections, seek to
explain election outcomes by exploring the relationship between voters, issues, and
parties. The relationship between the Democratic Party and the issues is known: the party
2

moved leftward over the course of the 20th century (Brookings 2013). The relationship
between voters and issues is also known: conservative voters who had been willing to
vote for conservative Democrats began to vote for conservative Republicans instead. In
spite of the prevailing political winds in the region, what factors allowed some Southern
Democrats to hang on through 2010? I analyze the effect that various demographic
factors, along with state party strength, had in allowing these members of congress to
remain in office—and explore how those same factors could be responsible for a
resurgence of Democrats in Southern House races.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
One possible explanation of continued Democratic success in the South post-1994
is the incumbency advantage. Ansolabehere and Synder (2002) hold that in competitive
elections, incumbent officeholders are more likely to win office than a non-incumbent
candidate of the same party (24). For congressmen with a particularly strong personal
brand, it is possible that their retirement was necessary for Republicans to win the seat,
after which the prevailing political winds in the region were able to cement Republican
control. Additionally, Jacobson (2015) notes that the incumbency advantage in U.S.
House elections reached its zenith in the 1980s, and subsequently declined to historic
lows by 2014 (862). As such, even in the absence of retirements, Democratic incumbents
may have found that their incumbency yielded diminishing returns each election until
they were finally defeated.
A second potential explanation of the successes and failures of Southern
Democratic House members comes from the creation of majority-minority districts.
Petrocik and Desposato (1998) address the theory that the creation of majority-minority
districts after the 1990 redistricting cycle led to the massive defeats the House Democrats
suffered in 1992 and 1994, by packing Black voters into few districts and reducing the
reliably-Democratic Black vote share in other districts. The authors simulate the effects
different racial compositions within a district would have on the outcome of its elections.
They conclude that while larger proportions of Black constituents increase the
Democratic margin in each district, it was the precipitous drop in white support for
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Democratic candidates that sunk the election of many Democrats in the 1992 and 1994
elections. This suggests that a lower proportion of Black voters and a generally pro-GOP
electoral environment were both necessary for these Democrats’ defeat (616). The New
York Times regularly publishes exit poll results for congressional elections. According to
that data, over the 12 election cycles analyzed in this paper, an average of 89.8% of Black
voters supported the Democratic candidate. For Hispanic voters, that figure was 66.1%,
and for White voters it was 43%. As more white voters defect from the Democratic party,
the threshold of minority voters necessary for a Democrat to win a majority-white district
in the South rises. Some of the lingering Democrats in the South after 1995 could be
explained by lower than average percentages of non-Hispanic White voters in their
districts.
The strength of the state Democratic party, as seen through the results of
simultaneous elections, could affect the results of U.S. House elections. The “coattails”
effect, wherein a successful presidential candidate drives up the margins for other
candidates of his party, has been observed for decades (see Calvert & Freejohn (1983);
Moreland (1973), and Mondak (1990)). Election results in other offices reflect the
strength of the party in the state, as quantified in the model developed by Ceaser and
Saldin (2005). States with Democratic-controlled legislatures, governorships, and Senate
seats would indicate a stronger organization for the Democratic party in that state. A
strong state party organization helps candidates of the party by providing campaign
resources and centralized fundraising (Herrnson 2009, 1210–1), thus prolonging
Democratic victories in a district.
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The shift away from Democrats in the South accompanied an urbanization and
suburbanization trend in the region. Slocum (2011) explores the relationship between the
growth of the Atlanta suburbs and the Republican vote, finding that beginning in the mid
20th century, nearly all the Republican growth in the state originated in the Atlanta
suburbs. In fact, it was not until the 1990s that rural Georgia began to turn away from the
Democratic party in gubernatorial and senatorial elections. (90). This trend was prevalent
across the South during the same time period. However, as of the 116th Congress, nearly
all Democratic members of the House, (including those in the South) are from urban and
suburban areas, corresponding to the Democratic Party’s increasing margins in urban and
suburban areas (Hopkins 2019). New York Times exit poll data indicates that in 1994,
43% of rural voters supported Democratic candidates; by 2010 that figure had fallen to
36%. The percentage of a district’s residents that reside in urban areas can affect the
viability of a party’s candidate in that district.
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HYPOTHESES
My first hypothesis is that incumbent Democrats in the House were able to hold
on to their seats after the 1994 Republican wave, but once they retired, they were
replaced by Republicans. I predict that the null hypothesis is true in this case, given that
some research has shown that the incumbency bonus seen in the 20th century declined
over the course of the analysis period.
My second hypothesis is that districts in which Democrats survived between 1994
and 2008 had lower percentages of non-Hispanic white residents than districts that
flipped Republican in 1994. Given that exit poll data shows white Americans are more
likely than any other racial group to vote for Republican House candidates, a larger
number of non-Hispanic white residents would correlate to greater success for the GOP
in those districts. While most congressional districts in the South are majority-white, a
larger population of racial minorities could have offset falling white support to some
degree.
My third hypothesis is that Democratic representatives fared better in states where
Democrats retained control of statewide offices, namely governorships, senators, and
state legislative chambers. Democratic control of statewide offices indicates a stronger
party organization, which would help Democratic candidates for House seats.
My fourth hypothesis is that Democratic candidates fared better in districts where
a higher percentage of the population lived in urban areas. As the rural vote shifted more
Republican in relation to urban vote, Democrats with a higher level of urban population
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in their districts would stand a better chance of retaining their seat by running up their
margin in urban areas, even if the district was still predominantly rural.

8

DATA
I collected data on all House general elections beginning in 1992 in the South as
defined by the Census Bureau: the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
I did not collect data on House special elections, since these elections are
characterized by low voter turnout and are not necessarily predictive of general election
performance (Cohn 2018). This amounts to 2,159 elections used as cases in my analysis.
A good deal of my analysis centers on the period between 1994 and 2008, for which there
are 1, 212 cases. While any definition of the region will inherently attract contention, the
U.S. Census Bureau defines the South as the states that allowed slavery at the outset of
the Civil War, minus Missouri and plus Oklahoma. Given that Census data forms the
bulk of the evidence I use in this paper and that the slave state/free state cleavage informs
much of the political differences between the South and the rest of the nation, I find that
this definition suits the purposes of this paper.
Each case is listed as a specific election in a specific year: for example, the 1992
election in Alabama’s 1st congressional district is one unit. Using congressional districts
as a unit of analysis presents some challenges due to the impermanence of their borders.
By law, they are required to change once per decade in order to maintain equal
population between them. In addition, sometimes congressional districts are redrawn in
the middle of a decade. This can be due to a court finding that the districts are unfairly
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gerrymandered on a partisan basis (such as Florida’s 2016 redistricting) (Klas 2015) or
racial basis (Louisiana in 1994 and 1996) (Hays v. State, 1996), or a state party
gerrymandering districts in their favor after taking control of the state legislature middecade (Texas in 2004) (Toobin 2006). Since every election could feature a different set
of district boundaries, data needs to be collected on a district-year basis.
For demographic data, I relied on the 1990, 2000, and 2010 U.S. Censuses, as
well as the American Community Survey, which has operated continuously since 2005.
Before 2005, demographic data on congressional districts were only available for the
106th and 109th Congresses (elected in 1998 and 2004, respectively). Thus, I was unable
to directly collect data for the 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, and 2002 elections. I imputed the
data where possible. Where there were at least two data points for a certain congressional
district shape, I extrapolated the trend to fill in the missing data. For example,
Tennessee’s 4th Congressional district had an average increase in its high school
graduation rate of 1.1% every two years between 2004 and 2010. Since I did not have
data for the district in 2002, I subtracted 1.1% from the 2004 value and entered it for
2002. When a congressional district had only a single data point, I copied that point for
the other elections under those same boundaries. While any imputed value will be
imprecise to some degree, the demographic figures tend to change very little year-overyear, so it is unlikely that imputed value greatly differs from the actual value.
After these corrections, 156 cases (7.2%) do not have urbanization data and 160
cases (7.4%) do not have racial data. These missing values are due to mid-decade
redistricting events that happened in Georgia (1996), Louisiana (1994, 1996), North
Carolina (1998), and Texas (1996, 2004) The additional four cases of missing racial data
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are due to omissions in the Census Bureau datasets. Since these redistricting events
occurred before the American Community Survey began collecting continuous
demographic data, no demographic data was ever collected for those district shapes. The
missing data is distributed randomly with respect to the values—whether a district had
high or low levels of urbanization, education, or white population has no bearing on
whether the data is missing. I do not believe these omissions significantly hamper my
analysis.
For each case (where possible), I collected the following data:
1. Whether the Democratic candidate won the race
2. Whether the race featured one or more incumbent members of the House
3. Whether the election was the first held after the state was redistricted
4. Whether the state’s governor was a Democrat
5. Whether the state legislature was wholly or partially controlled by Democrats
6. Whether the state’s U.S. Senators were Democrats
7. Whether the state voted for the Democratic candidate in the most recent
presidential election
8. The district’s Democratic Party Strength (DPS) score (explained below)
9. The percentage of the district’s residents who identified as non-Hispanic whites
10. The percentage of the district’s residents who lived in census tracts defined as
“urban” by the Census Bureau
Categories 1–3 relate to the characteristics of the election itself. Categories 4–7 relate to
the strength of other Democrats in the state in which the election was held. Categories 8–
11 relate to the demographic features of the district.
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For category 1, I used the “Congressional Election Statistics” reports that the
Clerk of the House of Representatives publishes following each general election. These
reports detail the number of votes each candidate received in all 435 House elections foe
the given election year. I retrieved the data for category 2 by cross-referencing the names
of the candidates in the election reports with the names in the previous Congress’s
“Official Alphabetical List of the House of Representatives”, a report also published by
the Clerk of the House on the “Congress Profiles” page. This allowed me to determine
whether the candidate in any given election was already a member of the House when the
election took place.
For category 3, I used the congressional district shapefiles created by Lewis et al.
(2019) These shapefiles are published for each congress, and so by comparing the shapes
between congresses I was able to determine whether a district’s boundaries had changed.
While it is customary for states to shift district boundaries according to the results of each
decennial census, there were several mid-decade redistricting events in many states
across the South between 1992 and 2018, making a careful analysis of district boundaries
necessary.
For category 4, I used the lists of former governors that the National Governors
Association published for each state, accompanied by the dates that their terms began and
ended, to determine the result of the most recent gubernatorial election for each case. For
category 5, I used the “Timelines of Partisan Composition” published by the National
Conference of State Legislatures to determine the partisan composition of each state
legislature following each election. For category 6, I used the U.S. Senate’s chronological

12

list of Senators. For category 7, I used the election results published by Dave Leip on
uselectionatlas.org.
Using the data from categories 4 through 7, I gave each district a Democratic
Party Strength (DPS) score, ranging from 0 to 4. In each of categories 4 through 7, I
assigned Democratic control a value of 1, split control (in the case of the state’s Senators
or state legislature) a value of 0.5, and Republican control a value of 0. The DPS score is
a simple sum of the four values from categories 4 through 7. This is a simplified version
of the Ceaser and Saldin’s model mentioned above: I use the same four elections, but
rather than average the share of the vote each party received in those elections, I use
win/split/lose categories. To implement their model exactly, I would have had to
aggregate thousands of election results across nearly three decades, and the constraints of
this project did not allow me to embark on such a massive data collection project for a
single variable. Since all of the elections I use to calculate the district’s DPS score are
held statewide, all districts within a given state will have the same DPS score as the other
districts in that state for that election cycle.
For categories 9 and 10, I used the American Community Survey and U.S. Census
data available through the Census Bureau’s American Fact Finder application (AFF has
since been decommissioned, with the data being moved to a new application on the
Census Bureau’s website). For each Congress, beginning with the 109th (elected in 2004),
the American Community Survey publishes demographic figures, including race,
aggregated by congressional district. Before the 109th Congress, demographic data on
congressional districts was published only for the 106th Congress. For congressional
elections for which there was not exact demographic data on the district, I imputed the
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data as described above. These demographic figures are published as raw population
numbers. Because there is some variance in population between congressional districts, I
converted the population figures to percentages by dividing them by the total population
of the congressional district as reported by the Census Bureau. As mentioned above, middecade redistricting led to there being no demographic data available for some
congressional districts.
The data for category 10 is determined by the Census Bureau following each
census. Like the racial data in category 9, the Census Bureau published figures for
congressional districts for the 106th Congress and for every Congress since the 109th. The
Census Bureau defines urban population as those living within a continuously built-up
area of 50,000 or more people, along with those living in incorporated places of 2,500 or
more people. This somewhat generous definition of “urban” encompasses those living in
cities, suburbs, and small towns. The Census Bureau only updates this data decennially,
unlike the demographic data which has updated annually since 2005; however, they have
revised figures for mid-decade redistricting events since 2005.
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CASE STUDY
The phenomena at play in Southern House districts can be illustrated by
comparing Kentucky’s 1st congressional district (hereafter referred to as KY-1) and
Arkansas’s 1st congressional district (AR-1). KY-1 takes the far western reaches of
Kentucky, snaking around Bowling Green to also include some counties in the southcentral part of the commonwealth. The primary population centers in the district are
Paducah, Henderson, and Hopkinsville, the last of which is the only city in the district
with over 30,000 people (Census Bureau Quickfacts). AR-1 centers on the northeast
corner of Arkansas, and in 2010 grew to encompass the entire eastern border of the state.
The largest city in the district is Jonesboro, home to Arkansas State University, with a
population of nearly 70,000; however, like Hopkinsville, Jonesboro is the only city in the
district to surpass the 30,000 mark in population (Quickfacts). The districts are separated
by less than 40 miles at their nearest points to one another and both are the only districts
in their respective states to border the Mississippi River. According to a report published
by the US Department of Agriculture in 2017, the districts are both heavily agricultural
and have a large number of family farms, indicating similar ways of life for citizens of
the two districts.
Currently, the two districts also resemble one another politically. As of 2020, one
would characterize both Kentucky and Arkansas as deeply Republican states on nearly all
levels, and the districts themselves haven’t been considered competitive for several
cycles. The Cook Political Report gives KY-1 a Partisan Voting Index score of R+23,
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and AR-1 a PVI of R+17. The PVI measures how a district is expected to vote relative to
the entire nation, so these scores mean that in a hypothetically tied national election, the
Republican candidate would be expected to win KY-1 by 23 points and AR-1 by 17
points (Wasserman & Flinn 2017).
These districts share a common political history. From Reconstruction until the
end of the 20th century, these districts elected an unbroken string of Democrats (Kentucky
Historical Society; CSPAN, 2010). In 1994, this changed with Republican Ed Whitfield
beating one-term incumbent Democrat Tom Barlow in KY-1 by less than one percentage
point. Meanwhile in AR-1, one-term Democratic incumbent congresswoman Blanche
Lincoln (née Lambert—she married and changed her name sometime between 1994 and
1996) won reelection by about seven percentage points. KY-1 has been in the Republican
column ever since the 1994 elections, while AR-1 continued to elect Democratic
representatives until the 2010 election, when Republican Rick Crawford won by about
eight percentage points after incumbent Marion Berry retired. Although the districts share
many features, they have several differences that could explain this 16-year divergence in
their political behavior.
I analyzed several data points for KY-1 and AR-1 between 1992, the last election
in which both districts elected Democrats, and 2010, the first election in which both
districts elected Republicans. The two districts differ in urbanization. An average of
37.1% of the population of KY-1 lived in urban areas, compared to an average of 45.0%
of the population of AR-1. The districts also differ in their racial composition. The
average percentage of the population that identified as non-Hispanic white was 90.1% for
KY-1 and 80.2% for AR-1. The two districts’ DPS scores differed greatly. Over the
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course of the analysis period, KY-1 had an average DPS score of 1.95, while AR-1 had
an average score of 2.7. This indicates that the Democratic party was much stronger in
Arkansas than it was in Kentucky between 1994 and 2010. Indeed, the only Republican
win in Arkansas before 2010 was Tim Hutchinson’s successful Senate campaign in 1996,
and he lost his first reelection bid to Democrat Mark Pryor in 2002. On the other hand,
Kentucky’s state legislature was split between a Democratic House and Republican
Senate following the 1996 elections, Kentucky’s last Democratic U.S. Senator left office
in 1998, and Republican Ernie Fletcher was in the Governor’s Mansion between 2003
and 2007.
This data gives insight into possible reasons why AR-1 stayed in the Democratic
Column for a decade and a half after KY-1 flipped Republican. With higher urban and
nonwhite populations, AR-1 contains more voters who are considered part of the
Democratic base. Additionally, results in other Arkansas elections during the analysis
period indicate that the Arkansas Democratic Party was in a stronger position than the
Kentucky Democratic Party, which may have helped Representatives Lincoln and Berry
stay in office. In 2020, any Southern congressional district like AR-1 that is both
majority-rural and over four-fifths white would be predicted as safely Republican, and
with good reason. However, during the transitional period between 1994 and 2010, AR1’s slightly higher concentration of typically-Democratic voting blocks may have been
able to sustain the Democrats’ hold on the seat.
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ANALYSIS
The simplest hypothesis for the lingering Democratic strength in Southern House
elections after 1994 is that incumbent Democrats maintained their seats due to their
personal relationship with their districts. Without an incumbent in the race, voters might
rely more heavily on the image of the party each candidate represents, rather than the
candidates’ personal brands, when making their decision at the ballot box. In the South
during this time period, this would benefit the Republicans. However, this hypothesis is
not borne out by the data.
I analyzed 1,212 individual House elections in the south between 1994 (the year
Republicans took control of the chamber) and 2008 (the last election before the
decimation of Southern House Democrats in 2010). Of these elections, 1,090 featured at
least one incumbent candidate, while 122 races featured no incumbent (commonly
referred to as “open seats”). I define incumbent candidates as those who held office in the
House of Representatives at the time of the election. Due to redistricting, sometimes two
incumbent Representatives ran against one another in the general election: these are put
into the same classification as elections featuring only one incumbent.
Fig. 2
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Democrats won 467 of the races featuring at least one incumbent, about 42.8%.
Democrats won 47 of the open seat races, about 38.5%. While the data shows that for this
time period incumbent Democrats won more often than Democratic candidates for open
seats, a Pearson’s Chi Square analysis of the crosstab yields a p value of .360, indicating
that incumbency and a Democratic victory are not significantly correlated. Even though
Democrats did perform slightly better in races featuring incumbents during this time
period in the south, the data are not conclusive enough to determine whether this is
actually due to some kind of incumbency bonus or simply the result of random chance.
My second hypothesis is that higher levels of nonwhite voters in a district led to
some Democrats being able to maintain their seats for a few election cycles, until the
increasingly Republican white vote became too big an obstacle to overcome. Thus, a
Southern Democrat in a district that was only 60% non-Hispanic white would be able to
last longer in Congress than one in a district that was 75% non-Hispanic white.
Fig. 3

Fig. 4a
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Fig. 4b

As shown in Figure 3, between 1994 and 2008, the mean House election in the
South took place in a district that was 67.7% non-Hispanic white, ranging from a
minimum of 12.6% (Texas’s 9th district in 2008) to a maximum of 98.5% (Kentucky’s 5th
district in 1994). The standard deviation between the districts was 21.4%. Figure 4 shows
the difference between districts won by Democrats and those won by Republicans
regarding the mean percentage of non-Hispanic white residents. The mean percent nonHispanic white in districts won by the Democratic candidate during that time period is
57.6%—for elections won by the Republican, 75.4%. An independent samples t-test of
the data yields a p-value of .000, indicating that between 1994 and 2008, Republicans
definitively won more often in districts with higher percentages of non-Hispanic white
residents.
Fig. 5a

Fig. 5b
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Fig. 6a

Fig. 6b

To understand how this finding relates to the effect non-Hispanic white
population had on Democratic success in Southern House districts on either side of the
main partisan transitional period, I analyzed the mean non-Hispanic white populations in
districts won by each party in both 1992, when Democrats still held a majority of
Southern seats, and in 2010, when nearly all Southern Democratic House members had
been wiped out. As illustrated in figure 5, the mean percent non-Hispanic white in
districts won by Democratic candidates in the 1992 elections was 66.9%, compared to
81.5% for Republican-won districts. The difference in the means between the two parties
is significant, meaning that Republican-won districts in the South were whiter than
Democrat-won districts even before the Republican Revolution in 1994. However, the
average percentage of white residents in Democratic-won districts in 1992 was much
higher than in the period between 1994 and 2008. Figure 6 shows the same figures for the
2010 House elections, where Democrat-won districts averaged 42.4% non-Hispanic
white, and Republican-won districts averaged 66.8%. This shows a much larger racial
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gap between Democrat- and Republican-won districts and the average percent nonHispanic white in Democratic districts falling below 50%.
Fig. 7

Knowing that information, the question remains as to whether the percentage of
non-Hispanic white residents in districts won by Democrats significantly decreased
within the transitional period of 1994–2008. As seen in Figure 7, the mean percentage of
non-Hispanic white residents in district won by Democrats declined from 62.8% in 1994
to 52.9% in 2008, even as the total number of Democrats elected stayed in a narrow range
during those years.
Fig. 8
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As shown in Figure 8, I conducted a One-Way ANOVA test among all elections
that Democrats won in the South between 1994 and 2008 for which the racial makeup of
the district was available. This test was to determine whether the distribution of the
percentage of non-Hispanic white residents in these districts was significantly different
across each election cycle (8 cycles in total). The test yielded a p-value of .004 and thus
determined the differences in the distributions to be significant. Between 1994 and 2008,
as whiter districts fell to Republicans, they were replaced by Democratic pickups in lesswhite districts. The results of the 2010 election, when Democrats went from holding 71
seats in the House to just 48 and the average percent non-Hispanic white in Democratic
districts fell precipitously, indicates that this process of Democrats exchanging whiter
districts for less-white districts failed as whites stopped voting for Democratic House
candidates en masse. These findings support the hypothesis that lower non-Hispanic
white populations helped Democrats to continue to be elected in certain districts.
My third hypothesis is that superior party infrastructure led to the maintenance of
Democratic seats in some states while states with weaker Democratic Party infrastructure
shed their Democratic House seats more quickly. A stronger state Democratic Party (in
terms of candidate recruitment, fundraising, and field operations) would logically be able
to deliver wins in other offices in addition to House elections. As discussed above, I
created a Democratic Party Strength (DPS) score for each district in each election year
using data from concurrent elections in the state to measure state party strength.
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Fig. 9

To give a general picture of Democratic party strength in the South between 1992
and 2018, figure 9 shows the mean DPS score for all congressional districts over the
course of the analysis period. The trend somewhat mirrors that of the percentage of seats
won by Democrats in the South shown in figure 1: dwindling sharply after 1992, then a
resurgence peaking in 2008, followed by another sharp decline. However, the percentage
of seats won by Democrats largely plateaued between 1994 and 2008, while the average
DPS score in the South declined steadily except for a brief uptick following the 2006 and
2008 elections.
Fig. 10a
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Fig. 10b

Figure 10 shows the mean DPS scores for districts won by Democrats versus
those won by Republicans between 1994 and 2008. Democratic-won districts have a
slightly higher mean DPS score than Republican-won districts, at 1.53 vs 1.42. With a
significance of .082, the difference between the means approaches, but does not reach,
statistical significance. This indicates that between 1994 and 2008, the DPS scores of
Democratic-won and Republican-won districts were not significantly different, and that
DPS as expressed through the results of other simultaneous elections did not have much
impact on Southern Democratic House candidates’ success.
Fig. 11a

Fig. 11b
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Fig. 12a

Fig. 12b

Knowing this about the transitional period between 1994 and 2008, I move to
analyze the elections immediately preceding and following that timeframe. As illustrated
in figures 11 and 12, the difference in mean DPS score for districts won by each party
was not significant in 1992, but it was significant in 2010. In 1992, the mean DPS score
of districts won by each party was nearly identical, indicating that just as many House
Democrats won in states where the Democratic Party was relatively strong as in states
where it was relatively weak. By 2010, with the average DPS score of Southern states
being so low, more Democratic House candidates held on in the few states where the
Democratic Party had even mild success.
This analysis indicates that there is not a strong relationship between state
Democratic Party strength as expressed through simultaneous election results and
individual Democrats’ fortunes in House elections between 1994 and 2008, although the
relationship between DPS score and Democratic victory in House districts became more
significant after the number of Southern Democrats in the House greatly decreased. This
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could be due to my calculation of DPS scores not accurately reflecting state party
strength, or because state party strength had little bearing on House elections in the South
during the analysis period. Further research would be necessary to answer that question.
My fourth hypothesis is that Democrats performed better in districts where a
larger share of the population lived in urban areas. As the rural voting block began to
support Republicans at a higher rate, Southern Democrats with larger urban populations
in their districts may have been able to hold on longer than their fellow Democrats with
less-urban districts.
Fig. 13

Fig. 14a

Fig. 14b

Figure 13 shows the range of urbanization among Southern congressional districts
between 1994 and 2008. The mean percentage of the population of a congressional
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district living in urban areas is 72.2%, with a minimum of 21.2% (Kentucky’s 5th district
between 1992 and 2000) and several districts being 100% urban. The standard deviation
between the districts was 20.9%. Figure 14 compares the mean urban population of
Republican-won and Democratic-won districts between 1994 and 2008. The mean
percent urban of Republican-won districts is 70.7%, and for Democratic-won districts it
is 74.3%. The difference between the two means is significant at the .01 level, meaning
that the data supports the hypothesis that Democrats did better in districts with higher
urban populations.
Fig. 15a

Fig. 15b

Fig. 16a
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Fig. 16b

I also analyzed the elections immediately preceding and following the analysis
period in order to gauge the importance of urbanization on Democratic performance in
Southern House elections before and after the partisan transitional period. Figure 15
compares the mean urban population share of Republican-won and Democratic-won
districts in the 1992 election cycle. Interestingly, the mean urban population share for
Republican districts was 77.1%, nearly ten percentage points higher than the Democratic
mean of 67.4%. This is the inverse of the pattern seen between 1994 and 2008. However,
the difference between these means does not reach statistical significance, and so the
evidence is inconclusive. Figure 16 shows the same data for the 2010 election cycle. In
this election, the mean urban population share for Republican districts was 68.1%, about
15 percentage points lower than the Democratic mean of 82.7%. This result is significant
at the .05 level. This is a much wider gap than what was seen between 1994 and 2008.

29

Fig. 17

Like with the non-Hispanic white variable mentioned earlier, I investigated
districts won by Democrats between 1994 and 2008 to determine if these districts became
more urban over the course of the analysis period. Figure 17 shows the mean share of
district residents living in urban areas for each election cycle. While there was an
increase from 70.1% in 1994 to 74.8% in 2008, the change in the figure between each
election cycle ranged from a 6.1% increase between 1994 and 1996 to a 2.8% decrease
between 2000 and 2002.
Fig. 18
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To determine the significance of the differences in the distributions of urban
resident percentage, I ran a one-way ANOVA test of all Democratic-won districts across
the 8 election cycles between 1994 and 2008, as seen in figure 18. The test resulted in a p
value of .833, strongly indicating that there is not a significant difference in variation of
the distributions of urban population among these districts. This shows that the urban
population share in Democratic districts in the South remained relatively stable between
1994 and 2008, in contrast to the decreasing non-Hispanic white population share seen in
Democratic-won districts over the same time period.
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CONCLUSION
Out of the four hypotheses, the second and fourth hypothesis have the most
support. Districts in the South that were less white and more urban were more likely to
continue to elect Democrats to the House after 1994. Incumbency and state party strength
do not seem to factor heavily into Democratic success in the South after 1994.
Although much of the history of the South is one of political unity, this
investigation into a key period of political transition for the region can shed some light on
the coalitions that create the South’s current political reality. Nonwhite voters and urban
voters are seen as important to Democratic electoral success across the entirety of the
United States, and while those voters are not numerous enough to deliver victories for
Democrats in much of the South, it is important to acknowledge their importance in
prolonging Democratic strength in some pockets. Additionally, the findings of this paper
indicate that while the South has long been seen as politically distinct from the rest of the
country, in the last few decades the political coalitions in the region have come to more
closely mirror those found nationwide. With increasing Democratic success in suburban
districts, regardless of the region of the country, the era of the “Solid South” may be
drawing to a close.
In the future, further analysis on the Democratic Party’s performance in Southern
House districts could investigate how other factors such as education, candidate ideology,
or subregions within the South affect electoral outcomes. The time frame of the study
could also be shifted to determine how the variables explored in this paper or other
factors contributed to Southern electoral outcomes during other times in history.
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